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Abstract
To understand leadership in international governance, I begin at the structural level with state actors. A simple frame-
work that relies on state interests and material power can shed light on why powerful states take on leadership roles
in some negotiations (e.g. arms control) but not in others (e.g. human rights). States attempting to cooperate to realize
joint interests or solve problems often face a set of common and persistent obstacles. These obstacles, which I call
‘cooperation problems’, can make otherwise beneficial cooperation difficult to achieve. I argue that the particular com-
bination of underlying cooperation problems present in an issue affects a powerful state’s desire to take on a leader-
ship position with respect to the incidence of international cooperation – that is, agenda setting by putting forth the
first draft of an international agreement addressing the issue and remaining in control of subsequent drafts. Because,
from a policy point of view, the most interesting cases are those that involve distribution problems, I focus on the fol-
lowing two combinations of problems: distribution with coordination and distribution without coordination. I use the
examples of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination and the Convention Against Torture to illustrate the theoretical discussion.
In this article, I explore the role of leadership in the inci-
dence of international governance structures. I focus on
individual international agreements as one important
form of international governance. Leadership is concep-
tualized as state leadership. As highlighted in the intro-
ductory article, the exercise of leadership pertains to the
ability of a state or group of states to bring together
actors characterized by different interests to achieve a
common goal. In particular, I focus on agenda setting as
leadership – that is, which state or group of states take
on a leadership position in initiating cooperative endeav-
ors by putting forth the first drafts of an international
agreement and, for the most part, remaining in control
of subsequent drafts.1
I assume that negotiations are about designing treaties
that help states realize their interests rather than about
persuading states to change or define their interests.
Therefore, depending on the underlying strategic struc-
ture, taking a leadership position in the initial negotia-
tions may be important to states. Specifically, I argue
that powerful states often want institutionalization
through international agreements (international law) and
want to control its terms through agenda setting in the
presence of certain combinations of problems but not
others.
Therefore, I consider state power in the material sense.
As I will elaborate, material power can be very useful
(but is not always necessary) in exerting leadership,
enabling an actor to supply positive and/or negative
incentives to other actors to encourage them to buy into
the leader’s agenda. Put bluntly, not only is the goal
often achieved; the goal is one that is aligned particularly
closely with the state leader(s)’ preferences – i.e. the
agreement text reflects closely the interests of the pow-
erful. Even in this case, governance outcomes are still
altered by the exercise of leadership because, in its
absence, the international agreement would not be
achieved.
My basic theoretical premise is that the cooperation
problem(s) underlying the cooperative endeavor (or put
differently, the underlying strategic structure that reflects
the joint and conflicting interests of state parties) are key
to understanding the necessity of leadership in the initia-
tion of international governance. Cooperation problems
also affect the nature of that leadership; do powerful
states take control of the agenda or do they allow others
to take on that leadership role?
What do I mean by cooperation problems? States
attempting to cooperate to realize joint interests or
solve problems often face a set of common and persis-
tent obstacles regardless of the substantive issue over
which they are cooperating. These obstacles, which I
call ‘cooperation problems’, can make otherwise benefi-
cial cooperation difficult to achieve. For example some
issues, such as trying to ban chemical weapons or try-
ing to promote the rights of women, pose huge infor-
mation obstacles: how can one state know what other
states are doing? Such uncertainty about behavior is
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absent in issue areas like the settlement of a bilateral
debt, for which behavior is quite transparent. Fears
that one’s partner in cooperation might cheat on an
agreement might make certain states unwilling to go
forward with cooperation, despite the gains that could
potentially be realized. Likewise, uncertainty about
whether cooperation will be beneficial in all possible
future conditions might make states forego current
cooperation and the short-term gains it could bring
simply because cooperation is perceived to be too
risky.
The focus on cooperation problems follows the Conti-
nent of International Law (COIL) research program (Ko-
remenos, 2013, 2015), which argues that the procedural
or design dimensions of international agreements can be
used to solve such problems, thereby increasing the inci-
dence and robustness of international governance. Here I
use this same framework to explore the need for and
nature of leadership in institutionalizing international
cooperation through some kind of governance structure
like an international agreement. COIL identifies eight dis-
tinct cooperation problems that states potentially face,
alone or in combinations. However, given that this is the
first application of the COIL framework to issues of lead-
ership, I begin with two cooperation problems – distribu-
tion and coordination (defined in the next section) – and
discuss what their interaction implies for the necessity of
state leadership in bringing about international
governance.
In the following section I introduce the underlying
assumptions of the COIL framework as well as my
assumptions about what happens to state interests dur-
ing an international negotiation. I elaborate the four pos-
sible combinations of distribution and coordination
problems, briefly bringing them to life for the reader. I
discuss which combinations might demand leadership
for their solution and whether powerful states are likely
to fill the agenda-setting role. I apply the framework by
examining the initiation of four international cooperative
endeavors: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ant-
arctic Treaty, the Convention Against Torture and the
Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. I
conclude with policy implications and ideas for future
research.
Assumptions
First, states are the main actors in global governance or
international cooperation. That is not to say that other
actors, like NGOs, are not influential. Nonetheless, such
actors are not the major force behind global order. At
the core of global cooperative activity are states exercis-
ing their power and realizing their interests through
international agreements and institutions – that is, the
body of international law.2
Second, states are rational actors that pursue their self-
interest when facing cooperation problems. Following
the tenets of rational choice theory, no assumption is
made about the sources of state preferences. States can
care about increasing their wealth, making themselves
more secure, protecting the environment and seeing
their human rights standards embraced by others. This
broad set of goals is not inconsistent. Nor do we find
states acting ‘less rationally’ in some issue areas or ‘more
rationally’ in others.3
Regarding the implicit ‘states as unitary actors’
assumption employed here, I assume there exists some
aggregation mechanism at the domestic level that yields
a state preference at the international level. Thinking
about states as unitary actors is without doubt a fruitful
theoretical assumption, but not one that necessarily
yields a complete empirical picture. Still, the assumption
serves as a useful baseline for later refinements.
With respect to what happens during the negotiation,
I assume that the leader or agenda setter puts forth the
first draft of the agreement and remains in control of
subsequent drafts. I differ in this regard from Hawkins
(2004), who states that ‘the drafting process provides a
setting in which persuasion can take place’ (p. 784). In
other words, I assume that state interests are rather
defined when the drafting process begins. Negotiation
may provide an opportunity for learning more about the
issue area or about one’s partners’ preferences regarding
cooperation, but rarely do interests change during the
process; this is in contrast to Hawkins (2004), who argues
that ‘state interests are sometimes uncertain and can be
formed over time through processes of communication
and persuasion’ (p. 780).
These simplifying assumptions may seem to place this
analysis at one extreme of the rich literature on leader-
ship and international politics.4 As Robert Jervis states
smartly in a recent article, scholarship on leadership in
international politics is ‘commonly linked to the level-of-
analysis question’ (Jervis, 2013, p. 153). Jervis looks at the
individual level but adopts a relatively moderate stance
regarding the degree to which individual leaders exhibit
agency with regard to foreign policy. In fact, some of his
conclusions are quite consistent with the more ‘extreme’
assumptions made here. For example, Jervis claims that
because political leadership may be restricted to a
homogenous body of candidates, political office tends to
socialize its office holders and leaders experience con-
straints on their power, individual political leadership
may have little effect on the interests and international
cooperative behavior of the state (Jervis, 2013).
Because international cooperation problems as con-
templated by the COIL framework are consistent, they
are necessarily integrated into a state’s foreign policy.
Jervis’s assessment of power in the American presidency
reflects this observation: the persistent needs and
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characteristics of a state will shape the leaders them-
selves as well as the policies that they support. The com-
mon ground and potential complementarities among the
various approaches to leadership are worthy of future
research.
Cooperation problems
At the core of international politics are problems of
enforcement, distribution and commitment as well as
struggles for power and influence, all of which are exac-
erbated by multiple kinds of shocks, uncertainties and
distrust. Even the most optimistic among us would have
to admit that international political interactions are char-
acterized by some subset of these problems at least
some of the time.
In this section, I identify two distinct and recurrent
cooperation problems that states may face either in isola-
tion or together when they attempt to realize the gains
of cooperation.
Let me begin with distribution problems. A distribution
problem captures the different preferences states have over
which alternative cooperative agreement to implement.
At one extreme in which actors prefer the same coop-
erative outcome, there is no distribution problem. Distri-
bution problems are greater in settings like arms control,
when actors want to cooperate but prefer alternative
cooperative outcomes regarding which weapons to ban.
At the other extreme, in a zero-sum game like setting
quotas for oil or coffee exports, the problem is strictly
distributive because a better outcome for one leaves less
for the others.
No major issue area is exempt from distribution
problems – not even human rights. Just as issues like
the death penalty, abortion and torture ignite major
debates among parties domestically, these same issues
animate human rights negotiations – the majority of
which are as fraught with distribution problems over
which rights to include, which to prohibit and even
how to define the rights themselves. Similarly, trade,
disarmament and environmental negotiations include
debates over import duties, which weapons to ban or
reduce and allotted quotas for sub-issues like fishing,
respectively.
Consider the challenges in the mid-1990s when
designing a cooperative agreement to solve the prob-
lems of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. At the time
the USA, South Korea and Japan essentially had to pay a
bribe to North Korea in exchange for North Korea
remaining a part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspections. The bribe is both very costly and
controversial. As Ambassador Stephen Bosworth stated:
‘they are three countries dealing with a question in
which they have a common stake, but over which they
have severe differences on how to deal with the Demo-
cratic People‘s Republic of Korea (quoted in Wit, 1999, p.
64). Thus the various ways to change the incentives of
North Korea and the various ways of splitting the costs
of doing so are at the heart of the distribution problem.
While all agreements require ‘coordination’ on agree-
ment text, COIL has a very specific definition of a coordi-
nation problem. In situations characterized by underlying
coordination problems, actors must coordinate on exactly
one outcome to be better off cooperating. The worse it is
to ‘miss’ some specific solution, the more severe the coordi-
nation problem.
The New START treaty between the USA and Russia,
and superpower arms control treaties more generally, are
characterized by an underlying coordination problem.
Suppose a superpower arms control agreement simply
stipulated ‘reduce ballistic weapons’. Then reducing by
any amount would constitute compliant behavior. But if
the two sides reduce weapons to different degrees in
such a competitive and sensitive issue area, it could be
argued (and has been by many US senators) that at least
one side is hurt very badly. Importantly, that state that
reduced more would prefer not to have had any agree-
ment at all.
It is important to note that traditional 2 9 2 game
representations sometimes conflate distinct cooperation
problems like distribution and coordination. Consider the
famous ‘battle of the sexes’ game: two actors share the
desire to pursue a common goal but have different pref-
erences with respect to cooperative outcomes. A couple
attempting to plan a date night, for example, might
agree on going out but disagree on where they should
go. Cooperative endeavors characterized by a battle-of-
the-sexes-style dilemma feature challenges with respect
to both distribution and coordination: ‘while both players
want to go out together, the conflict [distribution] ele-
ment is present because their preferred activities differ,
and the coordination element is present because they
may end up going to different events if communication
between them is limited’ (Lau and Mui, 2008, p. 154). Put
differently, coordinating on an exact movie (or ballet) is
not mentioned as a necessary condition of one of the
Pareto optimal outcomes of the battle of the sexes. Yet
most would agree that, in such a situation, coordinating
on different movies is worse than no coordination at all!
In the following sections, I elaborate the four possible
combinations of distribution and coordination problems.
(Much of this draws on Koremenos and Hong, 2013 and
Koremenos, 2015.) Various combinations of distribution
and coordination are then used to explain the importance
of leadership as well as the role power plays (or does not
play) in the initiation of four international cooperative
endeavors: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ant-
arctic Treaty, the Convention Against Torture and the Con-
vention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
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Both distribution and coordination
In many issue areas where there is a distribution problem,
there is also a coordination problem in which complete
coordination is necessary (e.g. one clear boundary, one
clear technical standard). Take the example of export quo-
tas in a commodity agreement. When states wanted to
cooperate to stabilize and raise the price of coffee, they
needed to coordinate exactly on a supply of coffee to
ensure that the price would be what it was intended to be.
Oversupply by one state would cause the price to change,
and defections in such strategic situations can cause the
entire agreement to fail. This was the case for many
attempts at coffee cooperation before the 1962 Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement (Bates, 1997; Koremenos, 2002).
Not only is complete coordination necessary or the parties
will be worse off, but states also have to divide the coffee
market – the epitome of a distribution problem.
Distribution without coordination
By contrast, consider a human rights agreement (HRA)
that calls for the abolition of child labor. If some states
define a child as someone under 18 and act accordingly
while others define a child as someone under 15, as long
as both are reducing child labor however they define it
both states are better off with the agreement than with-
out it. Surely the state that defines a child as under 18
would prefer the other state to act in a similar fashion,
but it still prefers the other state reducing child labor for
those under 15 than not reducing it at all.
Only coordination
In the security issue area, bilateral efforts aimed at protect-
ing classified information are extremely important among
allies. Before cooperation can commence, states must first
coordinate on what is considered classified and who
exactly has access to such information. The underlying
problem is not really about who gets how much.
Neither coordination nor distribution
Some cooperative endeavors have neither coordination
nor distribution problems underlying them, like those
that encourage sharing of scientific information. For
example, there is a set of agreements by which Germany
sends scientists to developing countries to help them
with issues like plant protection.
When is leadership necessary and will the
powerful states lead?
In this section, I consider the four possible combinations
of distribution and coordination problems. I begin with
distribution without coordination because the spatial
model introduced can then be used to explain the other
three combinations. In the subsequent section, I present
the case studies.
Distribution without coordination: nonpowerful state(s)
can take leadership
As briefly mentioned earlier, HRAs are often the subject
of an underlying distribution problem: each state wants
to see its preferred norm be the one that is codified or
exported to other states. But if State B embodies a
slightly different norm than the one promulgated by
State A, State A can keep its norm and is not worse off
than it would be without an agreement. I now elaborate
what this combination of ‘distribution but no coordina-
tion’ looks like in a typical HRA negotiation and the
implications for who takes on the leadership position.
Consider the negotiation of a HRA as a strategic inter-
action between two states, State 1 and State 2. These
two states have asymmetric preferences over a particular
substantive human rights norm yet they believe in the
importance of human rights standards. This common
interest sets them apart from certain other states that
have no interest in setting and spreading human rights
standards.
Suppose the standard in question is women’s rights
and the scale of this norm ranges from 1 to 10. The
norm equals 1 when women are considered not equal to
men in any way and 10 when women are not only con-
sidered equal in every way but also all national laws and
pay rates must be changed to reflect this standard. State
1 (a middle-power state) has norm 8, including nondis-
crimination against women in the workplace enforced by
a state agency, while State 2 (a very powerful state) has
norm 6, including nondiscrimination against women in
the workplace. Consider the following scenario. If either
state needs to change its standard, it prefers no agree-
ment at all to an agreement with a higher or lower stan-
dard. Still, although both states strongly prefer to remain
with their own specific norms, as long as they are not
pressured to switch to the other’s standard and thereby
pay the implementation costs of such a change, they
accept that the other party will remain regulated by its
own norm. They prefer an improved international human
rights standard on women’s rights to no agreement at
all.
The outcome just described can be achieved through
the design provision of vague language, a form of flexibil-
ity (Koremenos and Hong, 2013; Koremenos, 2015). The
language of the treaty could read, ‘women will not be dis-
criminated against in the workplace, and this right shall be
enforced by state agencies when possible given constitu-
tional or other constraints’, or ‘nondiscrimination in the
workplace enforced by state agencies, as long as the new
policies do not run counter to national laws’. Employing
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such language, HRAs accommodate states with asymmet-
ric preferences over the specifics of substantive human
rights standards but with a common desire to raise stan-
dards for third parties. Importantly to States 1 and 2 (repre-
sented by Group A in Figure 1), states whose behavior
reflects norms that fall below what can be interpreted
through the vague language (states in Group B) are forced
to change at least somewhat if they want to be in compli-
ance with the agreement.
What does the spatial diagram imply for leadership?
Leadership is needed to set the agenda by writing a
draft agreement that reflects Group A’s general norms;
Group A can then attempt to export these norms to oth-
ers, like Group B. However, because of the lack of a coor-
dination problem, leadership can be taken by any state
in Group A. Thus State 1 in this example can set the
agenda; the more powerful state (State 2) accepts State
1’s leadership as long as the agreement terms are vague
enough to accommodate State 2’s norms. In other words,
by allowing State 1 to write the first draft and set the
agenda, State 2 is not being persuaded to change its
interests; rather, State 2 can make minor (if any) changes
in its policy if flexibility in language is employed. Like-
wise, State 2 can add reservations to the agreement if it
is an outlier on any particular provision. Thus, in situations
of distribution without coordination, nonpowerful state(s)
can take leadership and write the draft agreement.
Both distribution and coordination: powerful states
take leadership position
Now consider once again Figure 1 but with the following
change: this time states will be better off cooperating
only if one point along the horizontal policy space is
chosen. That is what a distribution and coordination situ-
ation would resemble. It is very much in the spirit of
Krasner’s (1991) ‘Global Communications and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’. A major contribution
of Krasner’s article was the recognition that, unlike the
simple 2 9 2 game, in the typical cooperative endeavor
states possess a wide range of choices (i.e. many possible
cooperative outcomes), often with different distributional
consequences. If actors prefer different outcomes, this
range of possibilities creates bargaining problems. There-
fore, a powerful state is likely to be interested in seeing
its most preferred outcome along this Pareto frontier
chosen.5
Thus not only must the states solve the distribution
problem, they must also coordinate on exactly one way
of solving it. The terms cannot be left vague to solve
the distribution problem; the coordination problem
implies that one solution must be chosen otherwise
the whole point of the agreement falls apart. This is
easy to imagine if one were to think of the horizontal
line as different ways to divide a body of water that is
likely to have valuable mineral deposits or fish. States
need one boundary, just as they do with respect to
other territorial issues. Leadership is needed to set the
agenda – to propose a way of choosing the outcome.
Powerful states will want to harness their resources to
make sure the cooperative agreement reflects their
desired policy.
Coordination without distribution: no leadership
necessary or leadership by expert, not powerful
This is what Krasner (1991) refers to as a simple coordi-
nation game where no prior investments have been
made and every possible point is preferred equally. Put
differently, the parties’ payoffs are symmetric across the
outcomes. Leadership is not always necessary; a randomi-
zation device could simply choose a point. Alternatively,
an expert might be useful in dictating the terms of the
agreement. By this I mean states with material power are
unlikely to exert any effort to control the agenda given
that there are no distributional consequences. If states
are indifferent among outcomes in that regard, allowing
an expert to choose or simply randomizing among the
outcomes in order to choose one is preferable.
As an example, one of the agreements in Koremenos’s
COIL random sample is the 1964 ‘Agreement Concerning
the Collection of Bills, Drafts, etc’. The agreement estab-
lishes a system for transferring funds internationally, and
states agree to institute a system for exchange of bills
and other collection mechanisms in their countries. The
distribution consequences are minimal but the coordina-
tion demands are acute.6
Neither coordination nor distribution: no leadership
necessary
Some cooperative endeavors have neither coordination
nor distribution problems underlying them, like those
that encourage sharing of scientific information. For
example, there is a set of international agreements by
which Germany sends scientists to developing countries
to help them with issues like plant protection. These are
typically bilateral agreements under which one state
gives aid or other assistance to another. Figure 2 summa-
rizes each of the possible combinations and the implica-
tions for leadership and power.
Cases
In this section, I will use the examples of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Antarctic Treaty (AT) and
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD), with an extremely brief discussion of the
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Convention Against Torture (CAT), to illustrate the theo-
retical discussion. Because, from a policy point of view,
the most interesting cases are those that involve distribu-
tion problems,7 I focus on the following two combinations
of problems: distribution with coordination and distribu-
tion without coordination. Specifically, I examine how the
particular combination present in an issue area affects a
powerful state’s desire to take on a leadership position
with respect to the incidence of international cooperation
– that is, agenda setting and putting forth the first draft,
and remaining in control of subsequent drafts.
Both distribution and coordination: powerful states
take leadership position
With respect to the NPT, the two superpowers (the USA
and USSR) faced a distribution and coordination problem.
Arms control in general is often characterized by these
two problems in combination. ‘Who gets what and how
much’ is at the heart of the distribution problem. More-
over, the balance of power would be affected greatly by
whether NATO and/or the Warsaw Pact states were able
to have nuclear weapons on their territory. Leaving such
things up to the discretion of the actors would be too
risky and would have undermined the entire endeavor.
In other words, unless the USA and USSR were quite
clear about the identity of the have and the have-nots
and that the resulting coordination point would preserve
the existing balance of power, neither would have
agreed to the NPT.
The NPT’s most substantive articles are a product of
preliminary negotiations between the USA and the USSR
on key issues and minimum demands. In other words,
the two superpowers took over leadership and set the
agenda even though the treaty was largely negotiated in
the context of an Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disar-
mament. One mechanism through which the superpow-
ers were able to control the committee was its cochair
system, which facilitated compromise by prioritizing dis-
cussion pertaining to their own agendas (Bourantonis,
1997). In fact, in the treaty itself the articles and clauses
that impose restrictions on nonnuclear weapon states
(NNWS) use precise language and create a practical
framework for enforcement by the IAEA. Soviet and
American influence resulted in relatively tighter restric-
tions than may have otherwise been imposed. For exam-
ple, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, a product of nonnuclear developing
states, allows its members to carry out explosions for
peaceful purposes whereas this is prohibited by the NPT
(Goldschmidt, 1980). In exchange for these restrictions,
NNWS sought an expansion of the treaty scope to their
benefit. Their interests are reflected in: Article IV, which
reaffirms the right of all members to pursue peaceful
nuclear technology; Article V, which encourages the
transfer and proliferation of peaceful nuclear technology
from nuclear weapon states to NNWS; and Article VI,
which promotes nuclear disarmament. However, the lan-
guage of these articles is extremely vague and nonbind-
ing. Article IV simply reaffirms an existing right. Article V
demands ‘appropriate measures’ to be taken for the shar-
ing of ‘potential benefits’ of peaceful nuclear technolo-
gies, essentially allowing nuclear weapon states to
decide arbitrarily what and how much (if any) technology
is to be shared. Article VI merely calls for disarmament
talks in ‘good faith’ at a nonspecific ‘early date’.
That the negotiations largely sidelined the concerns of
NNWS is evidenced by the 1965 UN General Assembly
resolution 2018 calling for a ‘proper balance of mutual
obligations and responsibilities’ in negotiations over
nuclear nonproliferation. However, ‘the nonaligned,
NNWS were not a solid bloc with a single point of view,
but rather were divided among themselves and consti-
tuted a whole spectrum of opinion’ (Epstein, 1980, p.
122), which undermined their ability to negotiate as a
bloc. The more militant ones, such as Chile, India, Brazil
and Pakistan, linked the concession of giving up the right
to possess nuclear weapons with the necessity for disar-
mament on the part of the existing nuclear weapon
states. Moderates such as Mexico and Sweden wanted
the NPT to be a step forward towards an eventual disar-
mament treaty, but regarded disarmament as too impor-
tant to be used as a bargaining chip in this one
(Bourantonis, 1997, p. 352). Both groups agreed that they
were being ignored by the superpowers and eventually
coalesced their demands into broad security guarantees,
nuclear disarmament and the proliferation of nuclear
technology. In 1966, the General Assembly resolved to
Figure 1. Vague language to solve distribution but no coordination.
‘Lower’
standard
‘Higher’ 
standard
Powerful state
Group AGroup B
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call for an exclusively nonnuclear state conference to
decide on how to best pursue these objectives (General
Assembly, Resolution 2153).
In response to this, the USA and the USSR used their
allies in the General Assembly to pass Resolution 2346 in
December 1967, which states that ‘it is imperative to
make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the ear-
liest possible date’ and ‘asked the committee to submit a
draft treaty before 15 March 1968’ (Bourantonis, 1997, p.
354). The calls for the relatively swift conclusion of the
NPT limited the potential expansions of scope in areas
such as disarmament and peaceful technology sharing.
The result of the clash between the demands of the
nonaligned/nonnuclear movement and the General
Assembly’s time constraints were Articles IV, V and VI.
These articles clearly respond to the general will of the
NNWS to receive ‘compensation’ for their renouncement
of nuclear weapons. However, the articles are vague and
only guarantee a right to pursue peaceful applications of
nuclear technology, without binding the nuclear powers
to disarm or provide peaceful technological assistance.
In sum, the superpowers submitted identical drafts to
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with
terms that reflected their interests but also with the
knowledge that they needed to appease the NNWS. The
extremely asymmetric treaty terms by which the perma-
nent UN Security Council members keep their weapons
and all other states forsake them cannot be seen as any-
thing other than reflective of the preferences of the pow-
erful states. In the case of the NPT, the two superpowers
took leadership in drafting the treaty, dictating its terms
and keeping control of its subsequent drafts, tweaking it
only to the extent necessary to get enough of the NNWS
on board. The limited duration, five-year review confer-
ences, vague arms control provision and technology
exchanges are the ‘compromises’ made by the two states
holding the power in the issue area. (Similarly, Heritier
and Prakash (2015) argue that the EU made the neces-
sary concessions to the chemical industry when it took
leadership in chemical regulation.)
The AT is also best described with this underlying strate-
gic structure given the complicated and contested territo-
rial issues and the potential mineral resources on the
continent. The nature of the distribution and coordination
problem combination stems from the fact that, in the
1950s, seven states claimed sovereignty over Antarctica.
The USA wanted neither to recognize the territorial claims
of these states nor to renounce the potential to make
future claims. The USA was also concerned about Soviet
interest in Antarctica given that the USSR formed an insti-
tution to conduct Arctic research in the 1920s and
expanded it to included Antarctica in the 1950s. Given the
potential value of the continent, the USA wanted to main-
tain control over both scientific research and mineral
extraction. Allowing claims to Antarctica to be recognized
in international law was against the USA’s interests. The
potential division of valuable territory is characterized by
both distribution and coordination problems.
After participating in a successful International Geo-
physical Year (IGY) (1957–58), the USA took leadership
on this issue by deciding a treaty was in its interests and
hence moved quickly. The USA invited the 11 other
active IGY states (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the
USSR and the UK) to a closed conference in Washington,
DC that resulted in the AT. The USA demanded an early
date for the start of the negotiating conference and
wrote the original and final drafts of the treaty.
Reflecting USA interests (US National Security Council,
1958), the treaty stipulates that Antarctica should forever
be used for peaceful purposes exclusively, prohibits any
kind of military measures, prohibits nuclear explosions
and disposal of radioactive waste, guarantees freedom of
scientific research and promotes scientific exchange of
both personnel and results, and establishes a compre-
hensive system of on-site inspection to ensure the obser-
vance of the treaty. Significantly, Article IV removes the
potential for sovereignty disputes by stipulating that the
legal position with respect to the sovereignty of treaty
parties is not prejudiced by any acts or activities taking
place during the lifetime of the treaty and that no new
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, may be
asserted while the treaty is in force (US Department of
State, 1959). Moreover, the position of the USA and the
(then) USSR is protected by a paragraph stating that
nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as ‘a renuncia-
Figure 2. Combinations of cooperation problems and implica-
tions.
Coordinaton No coordination
D
is
tri
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n
Powerful states take 
leadership position
Nonpowerful states can take 
leadership position
N
o 
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No leadership necessary or 
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Global Policy (2015) 6:3 © 2015 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
State Leadership in International Governance 243
tion or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis
of claim to territorial sovereignty’. In other words, accord-
ing to Article IV, the parties agree not to press or
surrender their divergent views regarding territorial
sovereignty. This was the solution to the distribution
problem and coordination problem desired by the US.
Consistent with Krasner (1991), the powerful state chose
the equilibrium outcome.
Distribution without coordination: nonpowerful states
can take leadership
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities to the Commission
on Human Rights controlled the agenda for the nego-
tiation of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The
member states composing that Sub-Commission in
1964 (the time CERD was drafted) were the USA, the
United Arab Republic, France, the UK, Italy, Mexico,
The Philippines, the USSR, Poland, India, Austria,
Sudan, Finland and Chile (UN Economic and Social
Council [ECOSOC], 1964b). Thus the group was com-
posed of both powerful states and nonpowerful states.
There is no evidence that the powerful states used
their material power to promise or threaten other
states with rewards or punishments to take control of
the agenda. Rather, both the USA and USSR, for
instance, proposed amendments to certain controver-
sial text around which there was a distribution prob-
lem, but in the end did not win out.
The drafting of Article 4, which engages freedom of
speech, provides a particularly good example of what
happened during the negotiations when distribution
problems were present within the Sub-Commission. Arti-
cle 4 states:
Parties condemn all propaganda and all organi-
zations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of
one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimina-
tion in any form, and undertake to adopt imme-
diate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such dis-
crimination (UN General Assembly, 1965).
The USA submitted a draft of Article 4 that did not have
the same bearing on freedom of speech as the final text.
This draft seems to have been overshadowed by more
‘radical’ drafts and amendments put forth in different ses-
sions and in different bodies (including the Commission
on Human Rights) by The Philippines and Mexico in the
Sub-Commission and the USSR and Poland in the Commis-
sion on Human Rights. Representatives from The Philip-
pines and Mexico wrote the initial text that was eventually
adopted by the Sub-Commission and that most resembles
the final draft eventually adopted in 1965.
During the Sub-Commission’s 20th session, the main
point of contention regarding Article 4 was its intent to
‘declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and all orga-
nized propaganda activities, which promote and incite
racial discrimination’ (UN ECOSOC, 1964a, p. 38). The USA
proposed an amendment to the article that would
require the insertion of the words ‘activities of’ before
‘organizations’ (UN ECOSOC, 1964a, p. 39), most probably
in the effort to protect the right of these organizations
to exist and the right of the people to consider them-
selves members.
Several representatives also felt that the purpose of the
paragraph was to penalize activities or acts prohibited by
law and not ideas, thoughts or intentions that did not lead
to acts. They pointed out that any attempt to outlaw poten-
tially harmful speech, publication and association in the
absence of any act would pave the way to grave abuses by
authorities in deciding whether a particular expressed opin-
ion was punishable or not (UN ECOSOC, 1964a).
The American amendment was then withdrawn in
favor of a Costa Rican amendment to the same effect. In
an effort to reconcile both perspectives, the Costa Rican
amendment suggested the article include the words ‘or
the activities of organizations, as appropriate’ after the
word ‘organizations’ (UN ECOSOC, 1964a, p. 39). The
USSR took a polar opposite position, advocating for the
replacement of the word ‘or’ in the Costa Rican amend-
ment with the word ‘and’ (UN ECOSOC, 1964a, p. 39).
Ultimately, the Sub-Commission accepted the Costa-
Rican-revised amendment (‘or the activities of organiza-
tions, as appropriate’). Somewhere along the way,
however (presumably in the General Assembly), the
amendment was removed.
In the end, the USA, UK, and France lodged reserva-
tions against Article 4 for its alleged infringement on the
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of association, ‘recognized as basic human
rights in articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights’ (UN ECOSOC, 1964a, p. 41). They were
certainly not persuaded to redefine their interests with
respect to free speech. Nor did they exercise power to
control the wording of the article to reflect their inter-
ests. The absence of a coordination problem did not
necessitate this strategy.
This example makes the point that states come to HRA
negotiations, as they do other negotiations, with clear
interests and are not persuaded to change or define or
redefine their interests during the negotiation. Rather, the
particular combination of cooperation problems underly-
ing many HRAs allows flexibility to be used so states can
interpret and/or tailor the treaty to fit their preferences.
My argument is consistent with Hawkins’ (2004)
description of the CAT negotiations: Sweden seems to
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have acted as the agenda setter of the CAT negotiation
as it provided the first draft. Hawkins also states: ‘Swe-
den, and later the Netherlands, provided most of the
initiative to keep the negotiations moving forward, and
the US did not make the treaty a priority’ (Hawkins,
2004, p. 797).
Thus given the absence of a coordination problem,
leaders of human rights negotiations are often less pow-
erful states who have an interest in promoting human
rights standards, i.e. the set of Scandinavian states. NGOs
and experts sometimes partner up with such states and
influence the drafting of the HRA texts. Reservations and
imprecision allow powerful states to be content with
treaty terms over which they did not exhibit leadership,
as this quote from US Secretary of State George P. Shultz
makes clear:
In view of the large number of States con-
cerned, it was not possible to negotiate a treaty
that was acceptable to the US in all respects.
Accordingly, certain reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations have been drafted to
reflect the federal system of the US, to clarify
the definition of ‘torture,’ to ensure that the pro-
visions relating to extradition and deportation
are consistent with US treaty obligations and US
law, and to reserve both to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
and to the competence of the Committee
against Torture to initiate investigations of the
US (Shultz, 1988, pp. v–vi).
Conclusions
A simple framework that relies on interests and power
can shed light on why powerful states take on leadership
roles in some negotiations (e.g. arms control) but not
in others (e.g. HRAs). A few policy implications can be
highlighted:
1. Powerful states do not take unconditional leadership
roles in setting the agenda for the negotiation of
international agreements. They do so only when their
interests cannot be served without leadership, as in
when distribution problems are combined with coor-
dination problems.
2. Persuasion is unlikely to occur during human rights
negotiations; rather, HRAs are strategically or rationally
designed to be vague and tend to have reservations
so that varying (yet stable) interests can be accommo-
dated. This does not imply that powerful states are
not interested in human rights cooperation, since they
are careful about the reservations they add.
3. Middle-power states can take on true leadership
under certain conditions, even when powerful states
are a part of the multilateral cooperative endeavor.
This article also suggests a future avenue of research.
While international cooperation starts with negotiation,
the implementation stage of any cooperative endeavor is
also important. Future work can explore whether particu-
lar cooperation problems can explain whether powerful
states take on a leadership role in the implementation of
a treaty. For example, in those endeavors characterized
by an underlying enforcement problem – that is, incen-
tives to defect and free ride on another’s cooperation –
powerful states may be more likely to take a leadership
position in implementation; their payoffs are adversely
affected by others’ defection. When enforcement prob-
lems are absent, powerful states are less interested in
taking leadership with respect to implementation – as in
many HRAs.
Moreover, Mattli and Seddon (2015) suggest that when
powerful states have an interest in implementation but
lack the ability to identify noncompliance, they may
encourage NGO monitoring even when the formal
monopoly on monitoring lies with the member states or
an intergovernmental organization (IGO) composed of
these states. These NGOs would be rule supporters, not
rule makers. As Mattli and Seddon (2015) state: ‘coopta-
tion arrangements also vary according to the number of
available partners. IGOs coopting easily substitutable
rule-supporters pay the lowest price when enlisting
external resources’ (p. 24). Given the number of NGOs
available for monitoring, powerful states are thus likely
to retain leadership in implementation if their interests
so mandate.8
Notes
I thank Raya Saksouk, Julia Gysel, Aseem Prakash, Adrienne Heritier,
Nicholas Hazen, David Garavito and Gianluca De Gasperi Delpino for
helpful comments or research assistance. I also thank the partici-
pants of the conference on ‘Global Governance and the Neglected
Issue of Leadership’, held at the European University Institute on
13–14 December 2013.
1. See Schoeller (2015) for a complementary analysis of how
Germany set the agenda with regard to Europe’s Fiscal
Compact.
2. See Koremenos et al. (2001), which defines ‘international institu-
tions as explicit arrangements, negotiated among international
actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior’ (p.
762). Thus each piece of international treaty law is considered an
international institution. I use the terms international law, interna-
tional agreement and international institution interchangeably
henceforth.
3. See Koremenos (2015) for large-scale confirmation of the fact
that states tend to design agreements in ways that solve cooper-
ation problems regardless of the issue area using a random sam-
ple of international agreements across the issue areas of
economics, environment, human rights and security.
4. See, for example, Hermann (1980) and Saunders (2011) for analy-
ses that zero in on the individual as an important explanatory
factor of foreign policy.
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5. This is similar to Schoeller’s (2015) argument about the supply of
leadership.
6. In the COIL sample, each particular agreement is characterized
by the presence (coded as high or 1) or absence (coded as low
or 0) of eachz possible cooperation problem. In reality, all situa-
tions are characterized by almost all cooperation problems to
some degree, but COIL codes them as existing if they are present
in high as opposed to low levels. For example, uncertainty about
preferences or type always exists to some degree in any interac-
tion, but a situation has to be characterized by high uncertainty
about preferences (e.g. the USSR and USA during the Cold War
as opposed to the USA and Canada during the same period) for
it to be considered present.
7. See too, Heritier and Prakash (2015).
8. Similarly, Saz-Carranza (2015) argues that the individual in
charge of a large IGO leader need not have a conflicting rela-
tionship with his/her principal. The extent to which the underly-
ing cooperation problems that necessitated the creation of the
IGO drive this principal–agent relationship is worthy of future
research.
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